

19 November 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: 19 November Meeting of the "Indochina Steering Group"

- 25X1A 1. I arrived at the meeting a few minutes late. [REDACTED] was discussing the status of [REDACTED] [REDACTED] forces are to be withdrawn from Laos and eventually replaced by a total of eight [REDACTED]. It is not likely that any [REDACTED] will be ready before April. This means they will not be available for use during this dry season. 25X6
- 25X6 2. There was a lengthy and complicated discussion of two contingency studies which have been underway; one was ordered by the President and deals with [REDACTED] contingency study. An inter-agency working group [REDACTED] (is the CIA man) dealing with this has met only once. No paper is in preparation yet. The essential question to be dealt with concerns [REDACTED] 25X6 A second contingency study, instigated by Kissinger, is much more elaborate and deals with Indochina as a whole. It is to include a detailed political scenario of future US actions to be taken. The scenario is nowhere near ready. Some of the related contingency plans are in early stages of preparation; an intelligence annex has been done under [REDACTED] auspices. Kissinger apparently expects that the Indochina study will be completed by about 1 December. Both of these contingency studies confusingly embrace varying aspects of work also being done in connection with NSSM 99 (see below). 25X1A
- 25X1A 3. [REDACTED] reported that the operation against Ban Ban has been slipped one week. Meanwhile, [REDACTED] indicates some enemy awareness of the plan. At this point, I said that I thought when Ban Ban was being discussed by this group last week that there was a clear 25X1D

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consensus that it was not advisable. Yet, the operation is approved. I thought we should earn our pay by taking positions on matters of this kind and making the consensus available to those making the decision. In response,

25X1A [redacted] pointed out that the Director and others were well aware of the negative aspects of the operation but chose to move ahead with it. The original field proposal has been rather drastically scaled down. It is to involve a raid in force and a quick withdrawal after destruction of supplies--it is not to be a seize-and-hold operation. The field plan for refugees has also been isolated from the Ban Ban plan and is being weighed separately.

25X1A 4. [redacted] reported on the recent Washington Order of Battle conference. He noted that intelligence is seriously declining in South Vietnam. This is due to less contact between forces and fewer numbers of prisoners and documents.

25X1D Enemy units are small. [redacted]

25X1D

[redacted] As ARVN forces take on increasing responsibilities, the problem will intensify because ARVN forces are not "intelligence-minded." [redacted]

25X1A

25X1A [redacted] seconded all of this and pointed out that the situation concerning our knowledge of enemy OB and manpower in Cambodia is even worse. It was agreed that [redacted] would do up a memo on this and it will be used in an effort to crank up DOD and the field to take steps to improve the situation. [redacted] pointed out in particular that we would be hard put, in the light of current information, to be very confident about our ability to monitor and verify any cease-fire.

25X1A

25X1A 5. I reported that we intended to produce a memo on the dangers ahead in Cambodia during the first week in December. I mentioned also [redacted] forthcoming trip to Laos and gave the group the background on the Director's request that we plan this type of trip. I also asked for a status report from other members of the group on what gives with NSSM 99. The short answer to this is that there is a great deal of material and a vast range of disagreements among those working on the problem. An intelligence annex of some sort has been done by OER [redacted] and was made available within the Agency for comment about a week ago. It was said that OCI has seen this. Other papers are expected in rather considerable

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volume some time Monday or Tuesday of next week. It seems very clear that we will all have a very short deadline for the preparation of comments. A Senior Review Group meeting is scheduled for 25 November and the status of responses to NSSM 99 is to be taken up by the principals at that time. I suggested (and it was agreed) that SAVA undertake to insure that all appropriate parts of the Agency have in fact seen and commented on all of the papers that relate to this exercise.

25X1A 6. [redacted] raised the question of next year's Presidential elections in South Vietnam. He thought we should discuss what action the US should take in this regard. Thieu may not be the best man and there should be plenty of lead time available to insure that the matter is thought through. [redacted] agreed and said we would take this up at our next meeting.

25X1A 7. [redacted] reported on his conversation with General Clay about methodologies concerning bombing results. The meeting went well.

25X1A 8. [redacted] reported that the Sihanoukville post mortem has been well received in PFIAB circles. [redacted] reported no indications as yet of any fall-off [redacted]

25X1A

25X1D

25X1D

25X1D

25X1D

25X1D

25X1A

9. Two matters of interest to OCI emerged at the end of the meeting. The group renewed an expression of interest in an eventual memo on developments in North Vietnam since Ho's death. I said we were still planning to come to grips with this. I would like to be able to tell the group at the next meeting approximately when we can complete such a memo. Second, [redacted] raised his concern over the increasing numbers of [redacted]

[redacted] This seemed to indicate some kind of build-up and he asked what is the level of Chinese strength in Laos at which we begin to sound the alarm. I mentioned our difficulty in reporting on some aspects of this since we are not at the moment privy to the details of US bombing operations. These operations have obviously caused the Chinese concern and they are taking steps to protect themselves with additional forces. The fact of US bombing operations in this area came as a surprise to virtually all of the group. [redacted] offered to try to obtain details on the US operations.

25X1A

[redacted]
Deputy Director of Current Intelligence

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25X1A

25X6

recrecning & ext^{lt} [redacted]
Thas training. Not likely to
be available before April. [redacted] to be
withdrawn (costly - no face-saving).
Southern Laos likely to suffer in the
meantime.

25X6

Many expectations they will
be available this dry season.

25X6

Contingencies Study - pres-decreed

25X6

What [redacted] doing re Cambodia

Has met only once; no paper in prep yet

Indochina Contingencies Study (K-investigates) by [redacted]

Intell
or so.

Plans & political scenarios (in a burst)

Intell
annex
done
by ONE

This pretty well coordinated but
plans being worked on now

25X6

Ban Ban has slipped a week.

25X6

[redacted] some NVN awareness.

Approval - raid & get out.

refugee plan separated out.

25X1A

[redacted] reflected concerns to DCI.
DCI got plenty of other side of corn

25X1A

2. [REDACTED] - OP conference. Intel declining in SVN. (less contact, prisoners, documents.) Unit arrangements are lessening ARVN not intel-minded

25X1D

CB a
marginal
situation
Cev station
help
Camb.
even
worse
only

25X1A

Memo

25X1D

NSSM #99

25X1A

Pres election next yr. What
should we be doing?
+ to take up next meeting.
fragility of SVN polit structure. Is there
the Mass? Sensitive but wrong to
leave to just a handful to decide.

25X1A

of R to
do a
memo
for use
in cranking
up DOD
in field.
will
have trouble
returning
any close
fire.

25X1D

25X1A

Clay conversation. Went well.
Methodologies for calculating effects of
bombing of logistics facilities.

25X1A

[REDACTED]
Point strike

SCI sent Schanoukville post-mortem
to Adm Anderson. Well-received.
Sorpetus clearly K's or Pres's.

25X1A

25X1D

A Year After Ho in Progress?

25X1A

Try to begin open a channel to NVN.

25X1D

[REDACTED] Chinese in No. Laos?

What about the concern?

Need to find out about F-4's.
Bombing Route 19

25X1A

[REDACTED] to get details

How
much
is enough
to sound
the alarm?



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11 March 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: North Vietnam Order of Battle

25X1A

1. Following the meeting of the "brethren" in SAVANNAH this morning, I talked with [REDACTED] of NPIC and [REDACTED] of IAS to see how feasible it might be to launch a special PI effort in hopes of obtaining more precise Order of Battle data than we now have concerning North Vietnam.

25X1A

25X1B

2. Unfortunately, there is no PI technique likely to help us with this problem. In the Soviet Union where the PIs made substantial inroads in recent years, [REDACTED]

25X1B

[REDACTED] Furthermore, most North Vietnamese forces are scattered about in local camps. The nature of the camps is such as to be almost impossible to distinguish from non-military facilities.

25X1A

3. I asked [REDACTED] to check with military departmental PI units around town to see if they had made any progress on this problem. [REDACTED] did so and reported that none has made a breakthrough.

25X1A

25X1A

4. [REDACTED] did say that there may be some "marginal areas" in which the PIs can be of assistance. He offered to set up a meeting of NPIC and IAS PIs to begin a dialogue with intelligence analysts on this topic. I explained that [REDACTED] people in OER were the ones largely responsible and we agreed that Paul could contact [REDACTED] who will be glad to arrange a get-together.

25X1A

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25X1A

Deputy Director of Current Intelligence
Distribution:

25X1A

1 - [REDACTED] VA
1 - [REDACTED] DD/OEP
1 - [REDACTED] DC/FR/DDP
1 - [REDACTED] Board of
National Estimates

1 - [REDACTED] OCT/VISIT REPORT

25X1A

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+ JC file

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11 March 1971

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: 11 March Meeting of "Indochina Steering Group"

1. Following are some of the highlights of this morning's meeting in SAVA.

25X1A 2. [REDACTED] reported that he has forwarded a package put together by him and other Agency officers on the question [REDACTED] fronting on Indochina. The 40 Committee yesterday authorized another [REDACTED] mission. Assuming another failure in this program, the outlook either for U-2 or SR-71 coverage would seem very good. 25X1C

25X1A 3. [REDACTED] reported that he will chair a new USIB Committee which will be put to work beginning tomorrow defining the needs for intelligence over the next several years in Indochina, outlining the affects on these needs of US withdrawals from the area and calculating the intelligence resources needed to keep the intelligence adequate.

25X1A 4. We all agreed that it is becoming of increasing importance to be able to answer with better precision than we now can the status and strength of North Vietnam forces remaining in reserve in the north as fighting flares in Laos. [REDACTED] agreed to examine this proposition. We are very dependent on the Pentagon for strength figures and the strength figures are very soft. It was agreed that I would look into the possibility of using photography to help us get a better handle on this.

25X1A 5. [REDACTED] reported on the friendly withdrawal from [REDACTED] Communist losses were very heavy. Some [REDACTED] at nearby site [REDACTED] have moved quite a bit farther to the west. There is uncertainty as to how the Cambodians reacted during the attacks on [REDACTED] They may have bugged out on their own. 25X6□ 25X1A 25X1A

25X1A 6. [REDACTED] reported on the basis of word from a returning OER traveler that relationships between the Saigon Station and MACV are at an all-time low. The pretext used

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by MACV was the recent OCI publication of an item concerning South Vietnamese military planning. [REDACTED] 25X1A
[REDACTED] is doing what he can to help [REDACTED] get this straightened out. It will probably require the Director's intervention at some point. 25X1A

25X1A 7. [REDACTED] reported that for the next six months (until September) two of the six [REDACTED] aircraft flying over Laos will be gone for overhauling and repairs. MACV has no replacements. This could cost us some intelligence. 25X1D

8. We agreed that [REDACTED] (who attended the meeting) will be the DDI hauncho on the Thailand aspects of NSSM-99. 25X1A

25X1A 9. [REDACTED] noted that there had been some drying up in the corridors in the past week. [REDACTED] is actually up but this has caused processing difficulties in the field. It was agreed that [REDACTED] would get in touch with [REDACTED] and see what could be done to speed things up. In the meanwhile [REDACTED] reported that [REDACTED]

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Deputy Director of Current Intelligence

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